In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE INTELLECT DAVID RUEL FOSTER Seton Hall University South Orange, New Jersey I. A Controversial Question? HE QUESTION of the immateriailiity of the intelloot s,an important part of the wider question about the nau11e of the soul. The axgiumen'ts for the immaiteriality of rthe intellect a11e particularly important to Thomas's thought because they undergil1d his argument for the incorruptibility of the soul; the incorruptibiility (...) of the soul, in turn, leads towards the dootrine of the immortaility of the soruJ, a tenet of faith which Thoma.s wants to explain and deifend.1 This article will present Thomas's two most prominent arguments for the immateriality of the intieliteot and critique the first iin light of rthe seoond.2 Whether,the principle of int~Uectual ilife must, by the very 1.Arguments for the immateriality of the intellect do not necessarily appear in articles on the incorruptibility of the soul but are always presupposed by them in Thomas. For example, in Summa theologiae I, q. 75, a. 6, "Whether the human soul is incorruptible?" (" Utrum anima humana sit corruptibilis "), Thomas supports the crucial premise in his argument by referring to the,arguments for the immateriality of the intellect in articles 2 and 5 (" Utrum anima humana sit aliquid subsistens? "; "Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma?" Summa theologiae I, q. 75, aa. 2 and 5). 2 Five important instances of the arguments are as follows: In Sententias II, d. 19, q. 1, a. l; Summa contra gentiles II, chapters 49-50; Summa theologiae I, q. 75, aa. 2 and 5; Quaestiones Dis-putatae De anima a. 14; Oompendium theologiae, De fide, chapters 79 and 84. This chronological ordering is based on Weisheipl's catalogue in Friar Thomas D'A.quino, pp. 355-406; and Eschmann's, A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Work, in Gilson's, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 381-439. The dating of the Compendium theologiae is the most problematic. 415 416 DAVID RUEL FOSTER natUJ.1e of its.act, be immaterial is a particularly controrverted question today. Many corutempo~ary thinkers helie¥e that human understanding can be ex:pfained in strictly physical terms. ':Chis was not the case in Thomas's day, and it is important to takie notre of this. Thomas W1as noit foroed by any opponent to sharpen his arguments for the imma.teriality of the inteHect. The major Islamic philosophers, ailithough they disagreed among themselves about aspects of the inbe1iJiect's nature (e.g., the plaice and ro[e of the agent intellect)' md agree thait the intellectual soul was immaterial. Plato and Aristotle, according.to Thomas, agreed on this f.undamental point. In fact, although there were post-Socratic materialists,3 Thoma;s usuru1Jy goes ha;ek to the Pre-Socratics in order rto give an example of someone who taJUght that the inte!IJiectual :act. depends entirely on physicrul principles. Perhaps it is better to s1ay that, because the doctrine of runiversal hylomorphism was so widely accepted in his time, Thomas was not challenged regarding the incorporeality of the intellect. Many of Thoma:s's contemporaries, foililowing the tewching of Awoobroin, held that the intellectuaJ. souil was composed of spiritua.l matter.and the appropriate form,4 hut this was not in opposition to Thomas's arguments for the immateriality of the intellect. II. The Two Most Prominent Arguments A. Type I The first argument (hereaf·ter caUed Type 1) proceeds from the intellect's potential to know all corporeal things. It is justifiably described as Thomas's preferred argument,5 for s For example, the Epicureans. 4 J. Weisheipl, "Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron," in Albert the priam rationem formalem, which is :to grasp the essence of the obj,oot. Then Thom!lis draws his conclusion " therefore,... the inte!llecrbuaJ soul itse[f is an absolute form." The conclusion that the irntellect's mode of being is immaterial, a " form without matter," follows from the premises: majorr premise, the objeclt is,in the knower in an ahso1uite way, i.e., without matter; minor premise, the object is received in the knower.ruooording to rthe mode of he... (shrink)

The aims of this dissertation are to categorize, clarify, and assess Thomas' arguments for the immateriality of the intellect. ;The five principal texts are: Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum II, d.19, q.1, a.1; Summa Contra Gentiles II, Chapters 49 and 50; Summa Theologiae I, q.75, aa.2, 5; Quaestiones Disputatae De anima, a.14; and Compendium Theologiae, Chapters 79 and 84. ;Of the thirty-six arguments for the immateriality of the intellect surveyed, thirty of them can be collected under five basic types. Type 1 (...) argues that since the intellect is in potency to know all sensible things it must not be composed of any sensible thing. Type 2--the intellect's grasp of the universal transcends the limits of matter and therefore it could not be composed of matter. Type 3--since knowing involves the unity of knower and known, impossible consequence follow if the intellect were material. Type 4--if the intellect were a material organ then it could not know itself as it does. Type 5--while contraries cannot exist together in a body, they do exist together in the intellect. ;Although some new arguments are introduced and others are dropped, types 1 and 2 remain the primary arguments throughout Thomas' career. Type 1 is preferred by Thomas, but it is actually type 2 that is most pervasive. The expression of type 2 varies more than that of type 1; type 2 is often combined with elements of other arguments, an indication of its fundamental character among these arguments. I argue that type 2 is the most fundamental argument for the immateriality of the intellect, and is most promising for use in the present day. ;Type 1 is an incomplete rendering of Aristotle and is inconsistent with Thomas' own description of the internal sense powers. Insofar as one fortifies type 1 by pointing to the different way the intellect has its object , one is actually using type 2 to maintain type 1. Furthermore, type 1 does not allow a proper assimilation of modern findings about brain function, and finally, it does a disservice to the unity of the person. (shrink)

Richard Connell’s book brings together Aristotle’s great metaphysical insight, that everything has four causes, with the discoveries of modern natural science. Whereas many contemporary philosophers and natural scientists think the question of the nature and number of causes is irrelevant or resolved, Connell thinks that they are indispensable distinctions that have been mauled beyond recognition.

Galgan wants to write a biography of being, and the character witnesses are Aristotle, Anselm, Descartes, and Feuerbach. The main points are that Anselm is a pivot between a classical and modern view of God in first philosophy, and that modern philosophers gave up the search for God by claiming to have found God to be man. Thus God was replaced by subjectivity--our subjectivity. The book is not a textual study, but does give a fairly close commentary on texts of (...) Anselm, Descartes, and Feuerbach. (shrink)

The most striking feature of Leo Elders’s book is the broad context with which he surrounds Thomas’s doctrine of nature. For example, his discussion of the soul provides a good review of the doctrine before and after Thomas, his discussion of “time” takes us from Parmenides to Einstein. Because Elders wants to refute those who think the doctrine of Thomas is simply of historical interest, he consistently relates Thomas’s teaching to the contemporary state of the question. He does a credible (...) job of discussing everything from general field theory, to quarks, to cell biology. (shrink)